Humane Letters 11: Ancient Greece

April 14 – April 17

Time Allotment: 80 minutes per day

TEACHER NAME: _____

STUDENT NAME: _____

Packet Overview

Date	Objective(s)	Pg. #
Monday, April 13	NO SCHOOL	
Tuesday, April 14	1. Read and annotate Book III, Chapters 1-4 2. Paraphrase Activity: Restate a key paragraph from the reading in your own words.	2
Wednesday, April 15	1. Read and annotate Book III, Chapters 5-8 2. Free writing to opening seminar question	3
Thursday, April 16	1. Read and annotate Book III, Chapters 9-12 2. Thesis and supporting topic sentences	4
Friday, April 17	1. Read and annotate Book IV, Chapters 1-2 2. Paraphrase Activity: Restate a key paragraph from the reading in your own words.	5

Additional Notes:

i. Assignments should be completed preferably in (a) a notebook or loose-leaf paper, but if you do not have access to these, you may type your work.
ii. Whether your write your assignments or type them, be sure to include the following:
    a. Place an MLA formatted four-part header at the top of a new assignment page (this is what you have always done for the essay header)
    b. Start each day's assignment at the top of a new page
    c. Designate and title each assignment with a day of the week in all caps, followed by the date (e.g. Tuesday, April 14)
    d. If typing, use double-spacing, Times New Roman, and 12 pt. Font
iii. If not in a notebook, keep all your written work in a folder (physical folder if written, digital folder if typed).
iv. A copy of the text is included at the end of this packet, but please use the physical copy if you already have it (ISBN: 978-0-87220-464-5)

Academic Honesty

I certify that I completed this assignment independently in accordance with the GHNO Academy Honor Code.

Student signature:

_____

I certify that my student completed this assignment independently in accordance with the GHNO Academy Honor Code.

Parent signature:

_____

Monday, April 13

Break!

Tuesday, April 14

Literature Unit: Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*
Lesson 1:

- ☐ Read and annotate Book III, chapters 1-4 *(40 min)*
- ☐ Review Reading Guide Questions (*10 min*)
- ☐ complete paraphrase writing exercise *(30 min)*

I. Reading Guide Questions: *You do NOT need to give a written response to these but do reference them as you read/after you read in order to clarify your understanding of the text.*

1. Distinguish between involuntary, non-voluntary, and voluntary.
2. Are acts committed out of fear voluntary?
3. Define constraint. Does it point to something internal or external, or both?
4. What is Aristotle's definition of ignorance?
5. What is the difference between actions done *due* to ignorance and those done in ignorance?
6. Of what could someone be ignorant?
7. Ignorance of which factors make an action involuntary?
8. What do sorrow and regret have to do with determining whether an action is voluntary or not?
9. What kinds of acts are committed in a moment of passion? Which are committed due to appetite? Are these acts voluntary?
10. Define "decision".
11. What is the relationship between decision and voluntariness?
12. What are the differences between choice and appetite or passion?
13. What are the proper objects of deliberation?
14. In our deliberations, what should be considered first: ends or means? Why?

II. Paraphrase Writing Exercise
After you finish reading and annotating the entire assignment, go back and look carefully at one of the two paragraphs designated below. Re-read every sentence slowly, phrase by phrase, word by word. Notice as many details as possible.

Next, put what Aristotle has said into your own words while preserving as much of the meaning in the original text as possible. Your paraphrase will be shorter than the original but try to capture with as much accuracy as possible precisely what Aristotle is trying to say but stated in more plain language. Perhaps imagine you are trying to explain what Aristotle is saying in the paragraph to a 10th grader who has not read the *Ethics* yet.

Special direction for composition: the number of sentences you will be asked to write will be determined for you, likely fewer than you would naturally. The aim is to encourage you to write more complex sentences than you might normally. You may need to use compound sentences

(a sentence containing two subjects and two verbs, i.e. two independent clauses, connected by the appropriate punctuation or combination of punctuation with a conjunction), subordinate clauses (often beginning with "which," "that," "who," or the like), prepositional phrases, etc. The sentences might get complicated, so it is important to make sure they are grammatically sound when you go back and proofread your paraphrase.

This exercise should take approximately 30 minutes and produce at least two-hundred words. To give you a sense of how long that is, the previous three paragraphs are 220 words.

Write a five sentence paraphrase on one of the following passages:

Passage #1 - *Ethics* Book III, Chapter 1, Section (§) 6

Passage #2 - *Ethics* Book III, Chapter 3, Sections (§)15-16

Wednesday, April 15

Literature Unit: Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*
Lesson 1:

- ☐ Read and annotate Book III, chapters 5-9 *(40 min)*
- ☐ review guiding questions *(10 min)*
- ☐ complete free-write to open question exercise *(30 min)*

I. Reading Guide Questions: *You do NOT need to give a written response to these but do reference them as you read/after you read in order to clarify your understanding of the text.*

1. While reading, think about what the brave man is "aiming" at.
2. How does Aristotle respond to the objection that carelessness may be part of a man's character?
3. How does Aristotle respond to the objection that the end appears different do different men?
4. Why does Aristotle think that most reckless men are reckless cowards? Is recklessness the same thing as fearlessness?
5. What are some qualities similar to bravery? Why are they not, in fact, brave?

II. RHETORIC: *Post-Reading Free-Write*
After you finish reading and annotating the entire assignment, respond in writing to one of the suggested "Opening Questions" (that is, the type of question with which we might "open" a seminar). Use the question as a starting point for your own thinking about Aristotle. The idea is for you to begin understanding Aristotle in order to start thinking along with him.

Your response should be based on what is stated in the text, but you do not need to use quotations. You should, however, include a citation (by line number, when appropriate, such as 1098a7) when you have something specific from the text in mind.

You should write at least 200 words. To get a sense of how long that is, the previous two

paragraphs are 117 words, so aim for about twice that. This assignment should take 15-20 minutes.

Opening Question

1. Aristotle discusses the virtue of bravery at greater length. Why does this virtue receive an expanded consideration?
2. Define the brave man. Define the coward. In what is the coward deficient and in what is he excessive?

Thursday, April 16

Literature Unit: Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*
Lesson 1:

- ☐ Read and annotate Book III, chapters 10-12 *(40 min)*
- ☐ review guiding questions *(10 min)*
- ☐ complete assigned thesis and writing exercise *(30 min)*

I. Reading Guide Questions: *You do NOT need to give a written response to these but do reference them as you read/after you read in order to clarify your understanding of the text.*

1. Define temperance.
2. What is the "irrational part" to which courage and temperance apply?
3. To what kinds of pleasures does temperance apply?
4. Why does Aristotle argue that few people have too much temperance?
5. Why does Aristotle argue that self-indulgence is more voluntary than cowardice?

II. RHETORIC: "Thesis" and Its Developments Exercise

After you finish reading and annotating the entire assignment, reflect on the whole of Book III. Before looking back into the text, consider how you would articulate the whole of Book III in simple terms. Perhaps think about articulating it to a 10th grader. Now, re-search Book III to find what you think to be Aristotle's articulation of the whole of Book III. Write out that 1-3 sentence "thesis" quote.

Next, do that same activity, but narrow the scope. Do the activity for three different chapters. Choose any three chapters in Book III that you think contain some of his essential developments of the previously chosen "thesis" quote. Then, write out those quotations with citations. After each of these three quotations, in 2-3 sentences explain the way Aristotle is developing the "Book III Thesis." This assignment should take approximately 30 minutes. Use your annotations to support your re-search for the quotations.

The format may look like the following:
Book III Thesis: "[insert quotation here]" ([insert citation here]).

Development #1: "[insert quotation here]" ([insert citation here]). [Explain how this develops the "Book III Thesis" here].

Development #2: "[insert quotation here]" ([insert citation here]). [Explain how this develops the "Book III Thesis" here].

Development #3: "[insert quotation here]" ([insert citation here]). [Explain how this develops the "Book III Thesis" here].

Friday, April 17

Literature Unit: Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*
Lesson 1:

- ☐ Read and annotate Book IV, chapters 1-2 *(40 min)*
- ☐ Review Guiding Questions (*10 min*)
- ☐ complete paraphrase writing exercise *(30 min)*

I. Reading Guide Questions: *You do NOT need to give a written response to these but do reference them as you read/after you read in order to clarify your understanding of the text.*

1. Explain the relationship of generosity to each of its extremes.
2. By what is the generous man characterized?
3. What is extravagance? What is stinginess?
4. Explain the relationship of magnificence to each of its extremes. How is it different from generosity?
5. What motivates the vulgar man?

II. Summarization Writing Exercise
After you finish reading and annotating the entire assignment, go back and look carefully at the two chapters on "generosity" and "magnificence."

Next, put what Aristotle has said into your own words about generosity, extravagance, stinginess, magnificence, and vulgarity, while preserving as much of the meaning in the original text as possible. While summarizing, relate Aristotle's points to a historical or literary figure that you believe possesses one of these states.

Special direction for composition: This exercise should take approximately 30 minutes and produce at least two-hundred words.

Write a five-sentence summary of one of the following, while connecting it to a character:

What character from history or a literary novel possesses generosity, extravagance or stinginess as a fundamental element of his/her character?

What character from history or a literary novel possesses magnificence or vulgarity as a fundamental element of his/her character?

Glossary

Bravery, *andreia*: Derived from the Greek word for man (male), *andreia* could be literally translated as "manliness". It refers to the behavior and traits that were often thought to be the supreme display of a man's virtue, and proof of his devotion to his city.

Decision, *prohairesis*: A decision is the result of (a) a wish, i.e., a rational DESIRE for some GOOD as and END in itself (1111b26, 1113a15); (b) deliberation, i.e., systematic RATIONAL CALCULATION about how to achieve the need (1112b15, vi 9). These result in (c) the decision, which is a desire to do something here and now, the action that deliberation has shown to be the action required to achieve the end (1112b26, 1139a21-b5).

Etymologically, *prohairesis* suggests 'choosing (*hairesis*) before'. For Aristotle the 'before' has a temporal sense (1113a2-9), though no doubt also a preferential sense. Many translators use 'choice' to translate it' but this is a misleading rendering, since Aristotle allows choice (*hairesis*) without deliberation or decision, and such choice does not count as *prohairesis*.

Fine, beautiful, *kalos*: What is *kalos* deserves admiration; the term is applied to aesthetic beauty but is not exclusively used to refer to it. Sometimes the adverb *kalos* just means 'well'. But often, as in 'judging finely' and 'deliberating finely' it has its narrower force. In its narrower use, *kalos* is especially connected with virtue. He virtuous person is often said to decide on actions that are fine, and he acts 'for the sake of the fine'; the finenesss of actions causes him to decide on them. The Greek word for gentleman, *kalos k'agathos* translates literally as 'beautiful and good'.

Particulars, *kath'kekaston, kath'hekasta*: Particulars include individual objects—e.g., this man or this tree—but also particular actions or situations. What I actually do when I act is not just killing, e.g., but a particular token of that type—killing in a definite way at some definite place and time. Particulars are the objects of PERCEPTION, not SCINECE.

Universal, *katholou*: A universal (or 'common' property) corresponds to every natural kind (e.g., dog, human being) and to every SCIENCE. Hence a science studies universals. ETHICS studies them too, as far as it can, though often it can only reach USUAL truths. Universals must be grasped by REASON, and grasp of them is an important part of deliberation leading to DECISION, since that applies universal principles to PARICULAR situations. The universal are grasped, according to Aristotle, through INDUCTION (*epagoge*) which, through the particular leads the individual to grasp the universal of the particulars. While induction might suggest requiring multiple particulars to move to an individual, *epagoge* can lead to a universal merely from a from sensing a single particular.

Voluntary, willing, *hekousios, hekon*: Aristotle seems to treat these two terms as synonymous. In ordinary Greek they both suggest absence of compulsion and of reluctance, as we speak of willing helpers, volunteers, and voluntary (as opposed to compulsory) service. Aristotle, however, regards unwilling, reluctant, and non-volunteered actions as *hekousia*; that is the point of 1110a4-b17. For this reason 'intentional' has sometimes been suggested instead of 'voluntary'. But 'voluntary' is tstill preferable in suggesting a reference to the agent's DESIRES

and preferences. Voluntary actions belong only to agents with desire, and are those caused by desires. Since ANIMALs and children have desires, they act voluntarily, though they lack rational desire and DECISION. Hence , in Aristotle's strict us of 'ACTION', not everything done voluntarily counts as an action.

1109b not easy to define in an account; for nothing else perceptible is easily defined either. Such things* are among particulars,* and the judgment depends on perception.*

§9 This is enough, then, to make it clear that in every case the intermediate state is praised, but we must sometimes incline toward the excess, sometimes toward the deficiency; for that is the easiest way to hit the intermediate and good condition.

BOOK III

[PRECONDITIONS OF VIRTUE]

1

[Voluntary Action]

Virtue, then, is about feelings and actions. These receive praise or blame if they are voluntary, but pardon, sometimes even pity, if they are involuntary.* Hence, presumably, in examining virtue we must define the voluntary and the involuntary. §2 This is also useful to legislators, both for honors and for corrective treatments.*

1110a §3 Now it seems that things coming about by force or because of ignorance are involuntary.*

What is forced has an external principle, the sort of principle in which the agent, or [rather] the victim,* contributes nothing*—if, for instance, a wind or people who have him in their control were to carry him off.

§4 But what about actions done because of fear of greater evils, or because of something fine?* Suppose, for instance, a tyrant tells you to do something shameful, when he has control over your parents and children, and if you do it, they will live, but if not, they will die.* These cases raise dispute about whether they are voluntary or involuntary.

§5 However, the same sort [of unwelcome choice] is found in throwing cargo overboard in storms.* For no one willingly throws cargo overboard, without qualification,* but anyone with any sense throws it overboard to save himself and the others.

§6 These sorts of actions, then, are mixed,* but they are more like voluntary actions. For at the time they are done they are choiceworthy, and the goal of an action accords with the specific occasion; hence we should also call the action voluntary or involuntary on the occasion when he does it. Now in fact he does it willingly. For in such actions he has within him the principle of moving the limbs that are the instruments [of the action]; but if the principle of the actions is in him, it is also up to him to do them or not to do them.* Hence actions of this sort are voluntary, though presumably the actions without [the appropriate] qualification are involuntary, since no one would choose any such action in its own right.

§7 For such [mixed] actions people are sometimes actually praised, *1110a20* whenever they endure something shameful or painful as the price of great and fine results. If they do the reverse, they are blamed; for it is a base person who endures what is most shameful for nothing fine or for only some moderately fine result. In some cases there is no praise, but there is pardon, whenever someone does a wrong action because of conditions of a sort that overstrain human nature, and that no one would endure.*

§8 But presumably there are some things we cannot be compelled to do. Rather than do them we should suffer the most terrible consequences and accept death; for the things that [allegedly] compelled Euripides' Alcmaeon to kill his mother appear ridiculous.*

§9 It is sometimes difficult, however, to judge what [goods] should be chosen at the price of what [evils], and what [evils] should be endured as the price of what [goods]. It is even more difficult to abide by our judgment, since the results we expect [when we endure] are usually painful, and the actions we are compelled [to endure, when we choose] are usually shameful. That is why those who have been compelled or not compelled receive praise or blame. *1110b*

§10 What sorts of things, then, should we say are forced? Perhaps we should say that something is forced without qualification whenever its cause is external and the agent contributes nothing. Other things are involuntary in their own right, but choiceworthy on this occasion and as the price of these [goods], and their principle is in the agent. These are involuntary in their own right, but, on this occasion and as the price of these [goods], voluntary.* But they are more like voluntary actions, since the actions are particulars, and [in the case of mixed actions] these particulars are voluntary. But what sort of thing should be chosen as the price of what [good] is not easy to answer, since there are many differences in particular [conditions].

§11 But what if someone says that pleasant things and fine things force us, on the ground that they are outside us and compel us? For him, then, everything must be forced, since everyone in every action aims at something fine or pleasant. Moreover, if we are forced and unwilling to act, we find it painful; but if something pleasant or fine is its cause, we do it with pleasure. It is ridiculous, then,* for him to ascribe responsibility to external causes, not to himself as being easily snared by such things;* and ridiculous to hold himself responsible for his fine actions, but pleasant things responsible for his shameful actions.

§12 What is forced, then, would seem to be what has its principle outside the person forced, who contributes nothing.

§13 Everything caused by ignorance is nonvoluntary, but what is involuntary also involves pain and regret. For if someone's action was caused by ignorance, but he now has no objection to the action, he has

1110b done it neither willingly, since he did not know what it was, nor unwillingly, since he now feels no pain.* Hence, among those who act because of ignorance, the agent who now regrets his action seems to be unwilling, but the agent with no regrets may be called nonwilling, since he is another case—for, since he is different, it is better if he has his own special name.

§14 Further, action caused by ignorance would seem to be different from action done in ignorance. For if the agent is drunk or angry, his action seems to be caused by drunkenness or anger, not by ignorance, though it is done in ignorance, not in knowledge. Certainly every vicious person is ignorant of the actions he must do or avoid, and this sort of error makes people unjust, and in general bad.

§15 [This] ignorance of what is beneficial is not taken to make action involuntary. For the cause of involuntary action is not [this] ignorance in the decision, which causes vice; it is not [in other words] ignorance of the *1111a* universal, since that is a cause for blame.* Rather, the cause is ignorance of the particulars which the action consists in and is concerned with,* since these allow both pity and pardon. For an agent acts involuntarily if he is ignorant of one of these particulars.

§16 Presumably, then, it is not a bad idea to define these particulars, and say what they are, and how many. They are: who is doing it; what he is doing; about what or to what he is doing it; sometimes also what he is doing it with—with what instrument, for example; for what result, for example, safety; in what way, for example, gently or hard.

§17 Now certainly someone could not be ignorant of *all* of these unless he were mad. Nor, clearly, could he be ignorant of who is doing it, since he could hardly be ignorant of himself. But he might be ignorant of what he is doing, as when someone says that [the secret] slipped out while he was speaking, or, as Aeschylus said about the mysteries, that he did not know it was forbidden to reveal it; or, like the person with the catapult, that he let it go when he [only] wanted to demonstrate it. Again, he might think that his son is an enemy, as Merope did;* or that the barbed spear has a button on it, or that the stone is pumice stone. By giving someone a drink to save his life we might kill him; and wanting to touch someone, as they do in sparring, we might wound him.

§18 Since an agent may be ignorant of any of these particular constituents of his action, someone who was ignorant of one of these seems to have acted unwillingly, especially if he was ignorant of the most important; these seem to be what he is doing, and the result for which he does it.*

§19 Hence the agent who acts involuntarily is the one who acts in accord with this specific sort of ignorance, who must also feel pain and regret for his action.*

§20 Since involuntary action is either forced or caused by ignorance, voluntary action seems to be what has its principle in the agent himself, knowing the particulars that constitute the action.*

§21 For, presumably, it is not right to say that action caused by spirit or *1111a25* appetite is involuntary.* §22 For, first of all, on this view none of the other animals will ever act voluntarily; nor will children.* §23 Next, among all the actions caused by appetite or spirit do we do none of them voluntarily? Or do we do the fine actions voluntarily and the shameful involuntarily? Surely [the second answer] is ridiculous, given that one and the same thing [i.e., appetite or spirit] causes [both fine and shameful actions]. §24 And presumably it is also absurd to say [as the first answer implies] that things we ought to desire* are involuntary. Indeed, we ought both to be angry at some things and to have appetite for some things—for health and learning, for instance. §25 Again, what is involuntary seems to be painful, whereas what accords with appetite seems to be pleasant.

§26 Moreover, how are errors in accord with spirit any less voluntary than those in accord with rational calculation? For both sorts of errors are *1111b* to be avoided. §27 Besides, nonrational feelings seem to be no less human than rational calculation; and so actions resulting from spirit or appetite are also proper to a human being. It is absurd, then, to regard them as involuntary.

2

[Decision]

Now that we have defined the voluntary and the involuntary, the next task is to discuss decision; for decision seems to be most proper to virtue, and to distinguish characters from one another better than actions do.*

§2 Decision, then, is apparently voluntary, but not the same as the voluntary, which extends more widely. For children and the other animals share in voluntary action, but not in decision; and the actions we do on the spur of the moment are said to be voluntary, but not to accord with decision.*

§3 Those who say decision is appetite or spirit or wish or some sort of belief would seem to be wrong. For decision is not shared with nonrational animals, but appetite and spirit are shared with them. §4 Again, the incontinent person acts on appetite, not on decision,* but the continent person does the reverse, by acting on decision, not on appetite. §5 Again, appetite is contrary to decision, but not to appetite. Besides, the object of appetite is what is pleasant or painful, whereas neither of these is the object of decision.* §6 And still less is spirit decision; for actions caused by spirit seem least of all to accord with decision.

§7 But further, it is not wish either, though it is apparently close to it.* For we do not decide on impossible things—anyone claiming to decide on them would seem a fool;* but we do wish for impossible things—for immortality, for instance—as well as possible things. §8 Further, we

1111b wish [not only for results we can achieve], but also for results that are [possible, but] not achievable through our own agency*—victory for some actor or athlete, for instance.* But what we decide on is never anything of that sort, but what we think would come about through our own agency. §9 Again, we wish for the end more [than for the things that promote it], but we decide on things that promote the end.* We wish, for instance, to be healthy, but we decide to do things that will make us healthy; and we wish to be happy, and say so, but we could not appropriately say we decide to be happy, since in general the things we decide on would seem to be things that are up to us.

§10 Nor is it belief. For belief seems to be about everything, no less about things that are eternal and things that are impossible [for us] than about things that are up to us. Moreover, beliefs are divided into true and false, not into good and bad, but decisions are divided into good and bad more than into true and false.

1112a §11 Now presumably no one even claims that decision is the same as belief in general. But it is not the same as any kind of belief either. For our decisions to do good or bad actions, not our beliefs, form the characters we have. §12 Again, we decide to take or avoid something good or bad. We believe what it is, whom it benefits or how; but we do not exactly believe to take or avoid. §13 Further, decision is praised more for deciding on what is right, whereas belief is praised for believing rightly.* Moreover, we decide on something [even] when we know most completely that it is good;* but [what] we believe [is] what we do not quite know. §14 Again, those who make the best decisions do not seem to be the same as those with the best beliefs; on the contrary, some seem to have better beliefs, but to make the wrong decisions because of vice. §15 We may grant that decision follows or implies belief. But that is irrelevant, since it is not the question we are asking; our question is whether decision is the same as some sort of belief.

§16 Then what, or what sort of thing, is decision, since it is none of the things mentioned? Well, apparently it is voluntary, but not everything voluntary is decided. §17 Then perhaps what is decided is what has been previously deliberated. For decision involves reason and thought, and even the name itself would seem to indicate that [what is decided, *prohaireton*] is chosen [*haireton*] before [*pro*] other things.*

3

[Deliberation]

Do we deliberate about everything, and is everything open to deliberation? Or is there no deliberation about some things? §2 By 'open to deliberation', presumably, we should mean that someone with some sense, not some fool or madman, might deliberate about it.

§3 Now no one deliberates about eternal things—about the universe, 1112a for instance, or about the incommensurability of the sides and the diagonal; §4 nor about things that are in movement but always come about the same way, either from necessity or by nature* or by some other cause—the solstices, for instance, or the rising of the stars; §5 nor about what happens in different ways at different times—droughts and rains, for instance; nor about what results from fortune—the finding of a treasure, for instance. For none of these results could be achieved through our agency.

§7 We deliberate about what is up to us, that is to say, about the actions we can do; and this is what is left [besides the previous cases]. For causes seem to include nature, necessity, and fortune, but besides them mind and everything [operating] through human agency. §6 But we do not deliberate about all human affairs; no Spartan, for instance, deliberates about how the Scythians might have the best political system.* Rather, each group of human beings deliberates about the actions that they themselves can do.

§8 There is no deliberation about the sciences that are exact and self- 1112b sufficient, as, for instance, about letters, since we are in no doubt about how to write them [in spelling a word]. Rather, we deliberate about what results through our agency, but in different ways on different occasions—about, for instance, medicine and money making. We deliberate about navigation more than about gymnastics, to the extent that it is less exactly worked out, and similarly with other [crafts]. §9 And we deliberate about beliefs more than about sciences,* since we are more in doubt about them.

§10 Deliberation concerns what is usually [one way rather than another], where the outcome is unclear and the right way to act* is undefined. And we enlist partners in deliberation on large issues when we distrust our own ability to discern [the right answer].

§11 We deliberate not about ends, but about what promotes ends.* A doctor, for instance, does not deliberate about whether he will cure, or an orator about whether he will persuade, or a politician about whether he will produce good order, or any other [expert] about the end [that his science aims at]. Rather, we lay down the end, and then examine the ways and means* to achieve it.

If it appears that any of several [possible] means will reach it, we examine which of them will reach it most easily and most finely;* and if only one [possible] means reaches it, we examine how that means will reach it, and how the means itself is reached, until we come to the first cause, the last thing to be discovered. For a deliberator would seem to inquire and analyze in the way described, as though analyzing a diagram. [The comparison is apt, since], §12 apparently, all deliberation is inquiry, though not all inquiry—in mathematics, for instance—is deliberation. And the last thing [found] in the analysis would seem to be the first that comes into being.*

1112b25 §13 If we encounter an impossible step—for instance, we need money but cannot raise it—we desist; but if the action appears possible, we undertake it.* What is possible is what we could achieve through our agency [including what our friends could achieve for us]; for what our friends achieve is, in a way, achieved through our agency, since the principle is in us. §14 [In crafts] we sometimes look for instruments, sometimes [for the way] to use them; so also in other cases we sometimes look for the means to the end, sometimes for the proper use of the means, or for the means to that proper use.

§15 As we have said, then, a human being would seem to be a principle of action. Deliberation is about the actions he can do, and actions are for the sake of other things; §16 hence we deliberate* about things that promote an end, not about the end. Nor do we deliberate about particulars, about whether this is a loaf, for instance, or is cooked the right amount; for these are questions for perception, and if we keep on deliberating at each stage we shall go on without end.

§17 What we deliberate about is the same as what we decide to do, except that by the time we decide to do it, it is definite; for what we decide to do is what we have judged [to be right] as a result of deliberation. For each of us stops inquiring how to act as soon as he traces the principle to himself, and within himself to the guiding part; for this is the part that decides. §18 This is also clear from the ancient political systems described by Homer; there the kings would first decide and then announce their decision to the people.*

§19 We have found, then,* that what we decide to do is whatever action, among those up to us, we deliberate about and [consequently] desire to do. Hence also decision will be deliberative desire to do an action that is up to us; for when we have judged [that it is right] as a result of deliberation, we desire to do it in accord with our wish.*

§20 We have said in outline, then, what sorts of things decision is about, and [specifically] that we decide on things that promote the end.

4

[Wish]

Wish, we have said, is for the end. But some think that wish is for the good, others that it is for the apparent good.

§2 For those who say the good is wished, it follows that what someone wishes if he chooses incorrectly is not wished at all. For if it is wished, then [on this view] it is good; but what he wishes is in fact bad, if it turns out that way. [Hence what he wishes is not wished, which is self-contradictory.]

§3 But for those who say the apparent good is wished, it follows that nothing is wished by nature. Rather, for each person what is wished is

what seems [good to him]; but different things, and indeed contrary things, if it turns out that way, appear good to different people.* [Hence contrary things will be wished and nothing will be wished by nature.] 1113a

§4 If, then, these views do not satisfy us, should we say that, without qualification and in reality, what is wished is the good, but for each person what is wished is the apparent good? For the excellent person, then, what is wished will be what is [wished] in reality, while for the base person what is wished is whatever it turns out to be [that appears good to him]. Similarly in the case of bodies, really healthy things are healthy to people in good condition, while other things are healthy to sickly people; and the same is true of what is bitter, sweet, hot, heavy, and so on.* For the excellent person judges each sort of thing correctly, and in each case what is true appears to him.

§5 For each state [of character] has its own distinctive [view of] what is fine and pleasant. Presumably, then, the excellent person is far superior because he sees what is true in each case, being himself a sort of standard and measure.* In the many, however, pleasure would seem to cause deception, since it appears good when it is not. §6 Certainly, they choose what is pleasant because they assume it is good, and avoid pain because they assume it is evil.* 1113b

5

[Virtue and Vice Are in Our Power]

We have found, then, that we wish for the end, and deliberate and decide about things that promote it; hence the actions concerned with things that promote the end are in accord with decision and are voluntary. The activities of the virtues are concerned with these things [that promote the end].*

§2 Hence virtue is also up to us, and so also, in the same way, is vice. For when acting is up to us, so is not acting, and when no is up to us, so is yes. And so if acting, when it is fine, is up to us, not acting, when it is shameful, is also up to us; and if not acting, when it is fine, is up to us, then acting, when it is shameful, is also up to us. §3 But if doing, and likewise not doing, fine or shameful actions is up to us, and if, as we saw, [doing or not doing them] is [what it is] to be a good or bad person, being decent or base is up to us.*

§4 The claim that 'no one is willingly bad or unwillingly blessed'* would seem to be partly true but partly false. For while certainly no one is unwillingly blessed, vice is voluntary.

§5 If this is not so, we must dispute what has been said, and we must deny that a human being is a principle, begetting actions as he begets children. §6 But if what we have said appears true, and we cannot refer back to other principles apart from those that are up to us,* those things that have their principle in us are themselves up to us and voluntary.

1113b §7 There would seem to be evidence in favor of our view not only in what each of us does as a private citizen, but also in what legislators themselves do. For they impose corrective treatments and penalties on anyone who does vicious actions, unless his action is forced or is caused by ignorance that he is not responsible for;* and they honor anyone who does fine actions. In all this they assume that they will encourage the second sort of person, and restrain the first. But no one encourages us to do anything that is not up to us and voluntary; people assume it is pointless to persuade us not to get hot or distressed or hungry or anything else of that sort, since persuasion will not stop it happening to us.

§8 Indeed, legislators also impose corrective treatments for the ignorance itself, if the agent seems to be responsible for the ignorance.* A drunk, for instance, pays a double penalty; for the principle is in him, since he controls whether he gets drunk, and his getting drunk causes his ignorance.* They also impose corrective treatment on someone who [does a vicious action] in ignorance of some provision of law that he is required 1114a to know and that is not hard [to know]. §9 And they impose it in other cases likewise for any other ignorance that seems to be caused by the agent's inattention; they assume it is up to him not to be ignorant, since he controls whether he pays attention.

§10 But presumably he is the sort of person who is inattentive.* Still, he is himself responsible for becoming this sort of person, because he has lived carelessly. Similarly, an individual is responsible for being unjust, because he has cheated, and for being intemperate, because he has passed his time in drinking and the like; for each type of activity produces the corresponding sort of person.* §11 This is clear from those who train for any contest or action, since they continually practice the appropriate activities. §12 [Only] a totally insensible person would not know that a given type of activity is the source of the corresponding state; §13 [Hence] if someone does what he knows will make him unjust, he is willingly unjust.*

Further, it is unreasonable for someone doing injustice not to wish to be unjust, or for someone doing intemperate action not to wish to be intemperate.* §14 This does not mean, however, that if he is unjust and wishes to stop, he will thereby stop and be just.* For neither does a sick person recover his health [simply by wishing]; nonetheless, he is sick willingly,* by living incontinently and disobeying the doctors, if that was how it happened. At that time, then, he was free not to be sick, though no longer free once he has let himself go, just as it was up to someone to throw a stone, since the principle was up to him,* though he can no longer take it back once he has thrown it. Similarly, then, the person who is [now] unjust or intemperate was originally free not to acquire this character, so that he has it willingly, though once he has acquired the character, he is no longer free not to have it [now].*

§15 It is not only vices of the soul that are voluntary; vices of the body

are also voluntary for some people, and we actually censure them. For we never censure someone if nature causes his ugliness; but if his lack of training or attention causes it, we do censure him. The same is true for weakness or maiming; for everyone would pity someone, not reproach him, if he were blind by nature or because of a disease or a wound, but would censure him if his heavy drinking or some other form of intemperance made him blind. §16 Hence bodily vices that are up to us are censured, while those not up to us are not censured. If so, then in the other cases also the vices that are censured will be up to us.

§17 But someone may say that everyone aims at the apparent good, and does not control how it appears, but, on the contrary, his character controls how the end appears to him.* [We reply that] if each person is in some way responsible for his own state [of character], he is also himself in some way responsible for how [the end] appears.*

Suppose, on the other hand, that no one* is responsible for acting badly, but one does so because one is ignorant of the end, and thinks this is the way to gain what is best for oneself. In that case, one's aiming at the end is not one's own choice; one needs a sort of natural, inborn sense of sight, to judge finely and to choose what is really good. Whoever by nature has this sense in a fine condition has a good nature; for [, according to this view,] this sense is the greatest and finest thing, given that one cannot acquire it or learn it from another, but its natural character determines [his] later condition, and when it is naturally good and fine, that is true and complete good nature.* If all this is true, then, surely virtue will be no more voluntary than vice.*

§18 For how the end appears is laid down, by nature or in whatever way, for the good and the bad person alike; they trace all the other things back to the end in doing whatever actions they do.* §19 Let us suppose, then, that nature does not make the end appear however it appears to each person, but something also depends on him.* Alternatively, let us suppose that [how] the end [appears] is natural, but virtue is voluntary because the virtuous person does the other things voluntarily.* In either case, vice will be no less voluntary than virtue; for the bad person, no less than the good, is responsible for his own actions, even if not for [how] the end [appears].*

§20 Now the virtues, as we say, are voluntary. For in fact we are ourselves in a way jointly responsible for our states of character, and the sort of character we have determines the sort of end we lay down.* Hence the vices will also be voluntary, since the same is true of them.

§21 We have now discussed the virtues in common. We have described their genus in outline; they are means, and they are states. Certain actions produce them, and they cause us to do these same actions in accord with the virtues themselves, in the way that correct reason prescribes. They are up to us and voluntary.*

1114b30 §22 Actions and states, however, are not voluntary in the same way. For we are in control of actions from the beginning to the end, when we
1115a know the particulars. With states, however, we are in control of the beginning, but do not know, any more than with sicknesses, what the cumulative effect of particular actions will be. Nonetheless, since it was up to us to exercise a capacity either this way or another way, states are voluntary.

§23 Let us now take up the virtues again, and discuss them one by
5 one. Let us say what they are, what sorts of thing they are concerned with, and how they are concerned with them. It will also be clear at the same time how many of them there are.

[The Individual Virtues of Character]

6

[Bravery; Its Scope]

First let us discuss bravery. We have already made it apparent that there is a mean about feelings of fear and confidence.* §2 What we fear, clearly, is what is frightening,* and such things are, speaking without qualification, bad things; hence people define fear as expectation of something bad.*

10 §3 Certainly we fear all bad things—for instance, bad reputation, poverty, sickness, friendlessness, death—but they do not all seem to concern the brave person. For fear of some bad things, such as bad reputation, is actually right and fine, and lack of fear is shameful; for if someone fears bad reputation, he is decent and properly prone to shame, and if he has no fear of it, he has no feeling of disgrace. Some, however,
15 call this fearless person brave, by a transference of the name; for he has some similarity to the brave person, since the brave person is also a type of fearless person.

§4 Presumably it is wrong to fear poverty or sickness or, in general, [bad things] that are not the results of vice or caused by ourselves; still, someone who is fearless about these is not thereby brave. He is also called
20 brave by similarity; for some people who are cowardly in the dangers of war are nonetheless generous, and face with confidence the [danger of] losing money.*

§5 Again, if someone is afraid of committing wanton aggression on children or women,* or of being envious or anything of that sort, that does not make him cowardly. And if someone is confident when he is going to be whipped for his crimes, that does not make him brave.

25 §6 Then what sorts of frightening conditions concern the brave person? Surely the most frightening; for no one stands firmer against terrifying conditions. Now death is most frightening of all, since it is a boundary, and when someone is dead nothing beyond it seems either

good or bad for him any more. §7 Still, not even death in all conditions—on the sea, for instance, or in sickness—seems to be the brave person's concern. *1115a*

§8 In what conditions, then, is death his concern? Surely in the finest 30
conditions. Now such deaths are those in war, since they occur in the greatest and finest danger.* §9 This judgment is endorsed by the honors given in cities and by monarchs. §10 Hence someone is called fully brave if he is intrepid in facing a fine death and the immediate dangers 35
that bring death. And this is above all true of the dangers of war.

§11 Certainly the brave person is also intrepid on the sea and in sickness, 1115b
but not in the same way as seafarers are. For he has given up hope of safety, and objects to this sort of death [with nothing fine in it], but seafarers' experience makes them hopeful. §12 Moreover, we act like brave men on occasions when we can use our strength, or when it is fine to be killed; and 5
neither of these is true when we perish from shipwreck or sickness.

7

[Bravery; Its Characteristic Outlook]

Now what is frightening is not the same for everyone. We say, however, that some things are too frightening for a human being to resist;* these, then, are frightening for everyone, at least for everyone with any sense. What is frightening, but not irresistible for a human being, varies in its 10
seriousness and degree; and the same is true of what inspires confidence.

§2 The brave person is unperturbed, as far as a human being can be. Hence, though he will fear even the sorts of things that are not irresistible, he will stand firm against them, in the right way, as reason prescribes, for the sake of the fine, since this is the end aimed at by virtue.*

§3 It is possible to be more or less afraid of these frightening things, and also possible to be afraid of what is not frightening as though it were 15
frightening. §4 The cause of error may be fear of the wrong thing, or in the wrong way, or at the wrong time, or something of that sort; and the same is true for things that inspire confidence.

§5 Hence whoever stands firm against the right things and fears the right things, for the right end, in the right way, at the right time, and is correspondingly confident, is the brave person; for the brave person's actions and feelings accord with what something is worth, and follow what reason prescribes.

§6 Every activity aims at actions in accord with the state of character. 20
Now to the brave person bravery is fine; hence the end it aims at is also fine, since each thing is defined by its end.* The brave person, then, aims at the fine when he stands firm and acts in accord with bravery.

§7 Among those who go to excess the excessively fearless person has 25
no name—we said earlier that many cases have no names.* He would be

1115b some sort of madman, or incapable of feeling distress, if he feared nothing, neither earthquake nor waves, as they say about the Celts.*

The person who is excessively confident about frightening things is 30 rash. §8 The rash person also seems to be a boaster, and a pretender to bravery.* At any rate, the attitude to frightening things that the brave person really has is the attitude that the rash person wants to appear to have; hence he imitates the brave person where he can. §9 That is why most of them are rash cowards; for, rash though they are on these [occasions for imitation], they do not stand firm against anything frightening. 1116a7 §12 Moreover, rash people are impetuous, wishing for dangers before 8, 9 they arrive, but they shrink from them when they come. Brave people, on the contrary, are eager when in action, but keep quiet until then.*

1115b34 §10 The person who is excessively afraid is the coward, since he fears 35 the wrong things, and in the wrong way, and so on. Certainly, he is also 1116a deficient in confidence, but his excessive pain distinguishes him more clearly. §11 Hence, since he is afraid of everything, he is a despairing sort. The brave person, on the contrary, is hopeful, since [he is confident and] confidence is proper to a hopeful person.

5 §12 Hence the coward, the rash person, and the brave person are all concerned with the same things, but have different states related to them; 7 the others are excessive or defective, but the brave person has the intermediate and right state.

10 §13 As we have said, then, bravery is a mean about what inspires confidence and about what is frightening in the conditions we have described; it chooses and stands firm because that is fine or because anything else is shameful. Dying to avoid poverty or erotic passion or something painful is proper to a coward, not to a brave person. For shirking 15 burdens is softness, and such a person stands firm [in the face of death] to avoid an evil, not because standing firm is fine.*

8

[Conditions That Resemble Bravery]

Bravery, then, is something of this sort. But five other sorts of things are also called bravery.*

The bravery of citizens comes first, since it looks most like bravery. For citizens seem to stand firm against dangers with the aim of avoiding 20 reproaches and legal penalties and of winning honors; that is why the bravest seem to be those who hold cowards in dishonor and do honor to brave people. §2 That is how Homer also describes them when he speaks of Diomede and Hector: 'Polydamas will be the first to heap dis- 25 grace on me', and 'For some time Hector speaking among the Trojans will say, "The son of Tydeus fled from me."'* §3 This is most like the

[genuine] bravery described above, because it results from a virtue; for it 1116a is caused by shame and by desire for something fine, namely honor,* and by aversion from reproach, which is shameful.

§4 In this class we might also place those who are compelled by their 30 superiors. However, they are worse to the extent that they act because of fear, not because of shame, and to avoid pain, not disgrace. For their commanders compel them, as Hector does; 'If I notice anyone shrinking back 35 from the battle, nothing will save him from being eaten by the dogs.'* §5 Commanders who strike any troops who give ground, or who post 1116b them in front of ditches and suchlike, do the same thing, since they all compel them.* The brave person, however, must be moved by the fine, not by compulsion.

§6 Experience about a given situation also seems to be bravery; that is 5 why Socrates actually thought that bravery is scientific knowledge.* Different people have this sort [of apparent courage] in different conditions. In wartime professional soldiers have it; for there seem to be many groundless alarms in war, and the professionals are the most familiar with these.* Hence they appear brave, since others do not know that the alarms are groundless. §7 Moreover, their experience makes them most 10 capable in attack and defense, since they are skilled in the use of their weapons, and have the best weapons for attack and defense. §8 The result is that in fighting nonprofessionals they are like armed troops against unarmed, or trained athletes against ordinary people; for in these contests also the best fighters are the strongest and physically fittest, not 15 the bravest.

§9 Professional soldiers, however, turn out to be cowards whenever the danger overstrains them* and they are inferior in numbers and equipment. For they are the first to run, whereas the citizen troops stand firm and get killed; this was what happened at the temple of Hermes.* For the 20 citizens find it shameful to run, and find death more choiceworthy than safety at this cost. But the professionals from the start were facing the danger on the assumption of their superiority; once they learn their mistake, they run, since they are more afraid of being killed than of doing something shameful. That is not the brave person's character.

§10 Spirit is also counted as bravery; for those who act on spirit also 25 seem to be brave—as beasts seem to be when they attack those who have wounded them—because brave people are also full of spirit.* For spirit is most eager to run and face dangers; hence Homer's words, 'put strength in his spirit', 'aroused strength and spirit', and 'his blood boiled'.* All 30 these would seem to signify the arousal and the impulse of spirit.

§11 Now brave people act because of the fine, and their spirit cooperates with them. But beasts act because of pain; for they attack only because they have been wounded or frightened, (since they keep away from us in a forest). They are not brave, then, since distress and spirit drives them in an impulsive rush to meet danger, foreseeing none of the 35

1117a terrifying prospects. For if they were brave, hungry asses would also be brave, since they keep on feeding even if they are beaten;* and adulterers also do many daring actions because of lust.

5 §12 Human beings as well as beasts find it painful to be angered, and pleasant to exact a penalty. But those who fight for these reasons are not brave, though they are good fighters; for they fight because of their feelings, not because of the fine nor as reason prescribes. Still, they have 4 something similar [to bravery]. The [bravery] caused by spirit would 5 seem to be the most natural sort, and to be [genuine] bravery once it has also acquired decision and the goal.*

9, 10 §13 Hopeful people are not brave either; for their many victories over many opponents make them confident in dangers. They are somewhat similar to brave people, since both are confident. But whereas brave people are confident for the reason given earlier, the hopeful are confident because they think they are stronger and nothing could happen to 15 them; §14 drunks do the same sort of thing, since they become hopeful. When things turn out differently from how they expected, they run away. The brave person, on the contrary, stands firm against what is and appears frightening to a human being; he does this because it is fine to stand firm and shameful to fail.

§15 Indeed, that is why someone who is unafraid and unperturbed in emergencies seems braver than [someone who is unafraid only] when he 20 is warned in advance; for his action proceeds more from his state of character, because it proceeds less from preparation.* For if we are warned in advance, we might decide what to do [not only because of our state of character, but] also by reason and rational calculation; but in emergencies [we must decide] in accord with our state of character.*

§16 Those who act in ignorance also appear brave, and indeed they are close to hopeful people, though inferior to them insofar as they lack 25 the self-esteem of hopeful people. That is why the hopeful stand firm for some time, whereas if ignorant people have been deceived and then realize or suspect that things are different, they run. That was what happened to the Argives when they stumbled on the Spartans and took them for Sicyonians.*

§17 We have described, then, the character of brave people and of those who seem to be brave.

9

[Feelings Proper to Bravery]

30 Bravery is about feelings of confidence and fear—not, however, about both in the same way, but more about frightening things. For someone is brave if he is undisturbed and in the right state about these, more than if he is in this state about things inspiring confidence.

§2 As we said, then, standing firm against what is painful makes us *1117a* call people brave; that is why bravery is both painful and justly praised, since it is harder to stand firm against something painful than to refrain 35 from something pleasant. §3 Nonetheless, the end that bravery aims at 1117b seems to be pleasant, though obscured by its surroundings. This is what happens in athletic contests. For boxers find that the end they aim at, the crown and the honors, is pleasant, but, being made of flesh and blood, 5 they find it distressing and painful to take the punches and to bear all the hard work; and because there are so many of these painful things, the end, being small, appears to have nothing pleasant in it.

§4 And so, if the same is true for bravery, the brave person will find death and wounds painful, and suffer them unwillingly, but he will endure them because that is fine or because failure is shameful.* Indeed, 10 the truer it is that he has every virtue and the happier he is, the more pain he will feel at the prospect of death. For this sort of person, more than anyone, finds it worthwhile to be alive, and knows he is being deprived of the greatest goods, and this is painful. But he is no less brave for all that; presumably, indeed, he is all the braver, because he chooses what is 15 fine in war at the cost of all these goods. §5 It is not true, then, in the case of every virtue that its active exercise is pleasant; it is pleasant only insofar as we attain the end.

§6 But presumably it is quite possible for brave people, given the character we have described, not to be the best soldiers.* Perhaps the best will be those who are less brave, but possess no other good; for they are ready to face dangers, and they sell their lives for small gains. 20

§7 So much for bravery. It is easy to grasp what it is, in outline at least, from what we have said.

10

[Temperance; Its Scope]

Let us discuss temperance next; for bravery and temperance seem to be the virtues of the nonrational parts. Temperance, then, is a mean con- 25 cerned with pleasures, as we have already said; for it is concerned less, and in a different way, with pains. Intemperance appears in this same area too. Let us, then, now distinguish the specific pleasures that concern them.

§2 First, let us distinguish pleasures of the soul from those of the body. Love of honor and of learning, for instance, are among the pleasures of the soul; for though a lover of one of these enjoys it, only his thought, not 30 his body, is at all affected. Those concerned with such pleasures are called neither temperate nor intemperate. The same applies to those concerned with any of the other nonbodily pleasures; for lovers of tales, storytellers, 35

1117b those who waste their days on trivialities, are called babblers, but not
1118a intemperate. Nor do we call people intemperate if they feel pain over money or friends.

§3 Temperance, then, will be about bodily pleasures, but not even about all of these. For those who find enjoyment in objects of sight, such as colors, shapes, a painting, are called neither temperate nor intemperate, even though it would also seem possible to enjoy these either rightly or excessively and deficiently. §4 The same is true for hearing; no one is ever called intemperate for excessive enjoyment of songs or playacting, or temperate for the right enjoyment of them.

§5 Nor is this said about someone enjoying smells, except coincidentally.* For someone is called intemperate not for enjoying the smell of apples or roses or incense, but rather for enjoying the smell of perfumes or cooked delicacies. For these are the smells an intemperate person enjoys because they remind him of the objects of his appetite. §6 And we can see that others also enjoy the smells of food if they are hungry.* It is the enjoyment of the things [that he is reminded of by these smells] that is proper to an intemperate person, since these are the objects of his appetite.

§7 Nor do other animals find pleasures from these senses, except coincidentally. What a hound enjoys, for instance, is not the smell of a hare, but eating it; but the hare's smell made the hound perceive it. And what a lion enjoys is not the sound of the ox, but eating it; but since the ox's sound made the lion perceive that it was near, the lion appears to enjoy the sound. Similarly, what pleases him is not the sight of 'a deer or a wild goat',* but the prospect of food.

§8 The pleasures that concern temperance and intemperance are those that are shared with the other animals, and so appear slavish and bestial.* These pleasures are touch and taste.*

§9 However, they seem to deal even with taste very little or not at all. For taste discriminates flavors—the sort of thing that wine tasters and cooks savoring food do; but people, or intemperate people at any rate, do not much enjoy this. Rather, they enjoy the gratification that comes entirely through touch, in eating and drinking and in what are called the pleasures of sex. §10 That is why a glutton actually prayed
1118b for his throat to become longer than a crane's, showing that he took pleasure in the touching.* And so the sense that concerns intemperance is the most widely shared, and seems justifiably open to reproach, since we have it insofar as we are animals, not insofar as we are human beings.

§11 To enjoy these things, then, and to like them most of all, is bestial. For indeed the most civilized of the pleasures coming through touch, such as those produced by rubbing and warming in gymnasia, are excluded from intemperance, since the touching that is proper to the intemperate person concerns only some parts of the body, not all of it.

11

[Temperance; Its Outlook]

Some appetites seem to be shared [by everyone], while others seem to be *1119a*
additions that are distinctive [of different people]. The appetite for nourishment, for instance, is natural, since everyone who lacks nourishment, dry or liquid, has an appetite for it, sometimes for both; and, as Homer says, the young in their prime [all] have an appetite for sex.* Not everyone, however, has an appetite for a specific sort of food or drink or sex, or for the same things. §2 That is why an appetite of this type seems to be distinctive of [each of] us. Still, this also includes a natural element, since different sorts of people find different sorts of things more pleasant, and there are some things that are more pleasant for everyone than things chosen at random would be.

§3 In natural appetites few people are in error, and only in one direction, toward excess. Eating indiscriminately or drinking until we are too full is exceeding the quantity that accords with nature; for [the object of] natural appetite is the filling of a lack. That is why these people are called 'gluttons', showing that they glut their bellies past what is right;* that is how especially slavish people turn out.

§4 With the pleasures that are distinctive of different people, many make errors and in many ways; for people are called lovers of something if they enjoy the wrong things, or if they enjoy something in the wrong way. And in all these ways intemperate people go to excess. For some of the things they enjoy are hateful, and hence wrong; distinctive pleasures that it is right to enjoy they enjoy more than is right, and more than most people enjoy them.

§5 Clearly, then, with pleasures excess is intemperance, and is blameworthy. With pains, however, we are not called temperate, as we are called brave, for standing firm against them, or intemperate for not standing firm. Rather, someone is intemperate because he feels more pain than is right at failing to get pleasant things; and even this pain is produced by the pleasure [he takes in them]. And someone is temperate because he does not feel pain at the absence of what is pleasant, or at refraining from it.

§6 The intemperate person, then, has an appetite for all pleasant *1119a*
things, or rather for the most pleasant of them, and his appetite leads him to choose these at the cost of the other things. That is why he also feels pain both when he fails to get something and when he has an appetite for it, since appetite involves pain. It would seem absurd, however, to suffer pain because of pleasure.

§7 People who are deficient in pleasures and enjoy them less than is right are not found very much. For that sort of insensibility is not human; indeed, even the other animals discriminate among foods, enjoying some

but not others. If someone finds nothing pleasant, or preferable to anything else, he is far from being human. The reason he has no name is that he is not found much.

§8 The temperate person has an intermediate state in relation to these [bodily pleasures]. For he finds no pleasure in what most pleases the intemperate person, but finds it disagreeable; he finds no pleasure at all in the wrong things. He finds no intense pleasure in any [bodily pleasures], suffers no pain at their absence, and has no appetite for them, or only a moderate appetite, not to the wrong degree or at the wrong time or anything else at all of that sort.* If something is pleasant and conducive to health or fitness, he will desire this moderately and in the right way; and he will desire in the same way anything else that is pleasant, if it is no obstacle to health and fitness, does not deviate from the fine, and does not exceed his means. For the opposite sort of person likes these pleasures more than they are worth; that is not the temperate person's character, but he likes them as correct reason prescribes.

12

[Intemperance]

Intemperance is more like a voluntary condition than cowardice; for it is caused by pleasure, which is choiceworthy, whereas cowardice is caused by pain, which is to be avoided.* §2 Moreover, pain disturbs and ruins the nature of the sufferer, while pleasure does nothing of the sort; intemperance, then, is more voluntary. That is why it is also more open to reproach. For it is also easier to acquire the habit of facing pleasant things, since our life includes many of them and we can acquire the habit with no danger; but with frightening things the reverse is true.

§3 However, cowardice seems to be more voluntary than particular cowardly actions. For cowardice itself involves no pain, but the particular actions disturb us because of the pain [that causes them], so that people actually throw away their weapons and do all the other disgraceful actions. That is why these actions even seem to be forced [and hence involuntary].*

§4 For the intemperate person the reverse is true. The particular actions are the result of his appetite and desire, and so they are voluntary; but the whole condition is less voluntary [than the actions], since no one has an appetite to be intemperate.

§5 We also apply the name of intemperance to the errors of children, since they have some similarity.* Which gets its name from which does not matter for our present purposes, but clearly the posterior is called after the prior.

§6 The name would seem to be quite appropriately transferred. For the things that need to be tempered are those that desire shameful things

and tend to grow large. Appetites and children are most like this; for children also live by appetite, and desire for the pleasant is found more in them than in anyone else.

§7 If, then, [the child or the appetitive part] is not obedient and subordinate to its rulers, it will go far astray. For when someone lacks understanding, his desire for the pleasant is insatiable and seeks indiscriminate satisfaction. The [repeated] active exercise of appetite increases the appetite he already had from birth, and if the appetites are large and intense, they actually expel rational calculation. That is why appetites must be moderate and few, and never contrary to reason. §8 This is the condition we call obedient and temperate. And just as the child's life must follow the instructions of his guide, so too the appetitive part must follow reason.*

§9 Hence the temperate person's appetitive part must agree with reason; for both [his appetitive part and his reason] aim at the fine, and the temperate person's appetites are for the right things, in the right ways, at the right times, which is just what reason also prescribes.

So much, then, for temperance.

Book IV

1

[Generosity]

Next let us discuss generosity. It seems, then, to be the mean about wealth; for the generous person is praised not in conditions of war, nor in those in which the temperate person is praised, nor in judicial verdicts, but in the giving and taking of wealth, and more especially in the giving.* §2 By wealth we mean anything whose worth is measured by money.

§3 Both wastefulness and ungenerosity are excesses and deficiencies about wealth. Ungenerosity is always ascribed to those who take wealth more seriously than is right. But when wastefulness is attributed to someone, several vices are sometimes combined. For incontinent people and those who spend money on intemperance are called wasteful. §4 Since these have many vices at the same time, they make wasteful people seem the basest.

These people, however, are not properly called wasteful.* §5 For the wasteful person is meant to have the single vicious feature of ruining his property; for someone who causes his own destruction ['lays waste' to himself, and so] is wasteful, and ruining one's own property seems to be a sort of self-destruction, on the assumption that our living depends on our property. This, then, is how we understand wastefulness.

§6 Whatever has a use can be used either well or badly; riches are something useful; and the best user of something is the person who has

1120a the virtue concerned with it. Hence the best user of riches will be the person who has the virtue concerned with wealth; and this is the generous person.*

§7 Using wealth seems to consist in spending and giving, whereas taking and keeping seem to be possessing rather than using. That is why it is more proper to the generous person to give to the right people than to take from the right sources and not from the wrong sources.*

For it is more proper to virtue to do good than to receive good, and more proper to do fine actions than not to do shameful ones;* §8 and clearly [the right sort of] giving implies doing good and doing fine actions, while [the right sort of] taking implies receiving well or not doing something shameful. Moreover, thanks go to the one who gives, not to the one who fails to take, and praise goes more [to the giver]. §9 Besides, not taking is easier than giving, since people part with what is their own less readily than they avoid taking what is another's. §10 Further, those who are called generous are those who give [rightly]. Those who avoid taking [wrongly] are not praised for generosity, though they are praised nonetheless for justice, while those who take [rightly] are not much praised at all. §11 Besides, generous people are loved more than practically any others who are loved because of their virtue; that is because they are beneficial; and they are beneficial in their giving.

§12 Actions in accord with virtue are fine, and aim at the fine. Hence the generous person will also aim at the fine in his giving, and will give correctly; for he will give to the right people, the right amounts, at the right time, and all the other things that are implied by correct giving. §13 Moreover, he will do this with pleasure,* or at any rate without pain; for action in accord with virtue is pleasant or at any rate painless, and least of all is it painful.

§14 If someone gives to the wrong people, or does not aim at the fine, but gives for some other reason, he will not be called generous, but some other sort of person. Nor will he be called generous if he finds it painful to give; for such a person would choose wealth over fine action, and that is not how the generous person chooses.

§15 Nor will the virtuous person take wealth from the wrong sources; since he does not honor wealth, this way of taking it is not for him. §16 Nor will he be ready to ask for favors; since he is the one who benefits others, receiving benefits readily is not for him.

1120b §17 He will, however, acquire wealth from the right sources—from his own possessions, for instance—regarding taking not as fine, but as necessary to provide something to give. Nor will he neglect his own possessions, since he wants to use them to assist people. And he will avoid giving to just anyone, so that he will have something to give to the right people, at the right time, and where it is fine.

§18 It is also very definitely proper to the generous person to exceed

so much in giving that he leaves less for himself, since it is proper to a generous person not to look out for himself. §19 However, ['exceed' must be explained;] in speaking of generosity we refer to what accords with one's means. For what is generous does not depend on the quantity of what is given, but on the state [of character] of the giver, and the generous state gives in accord with one's means. Hence one who gives less than another may still be more generous, if he has less to give. 1120b

§20 Those who have not acquired their means by their own efforts, but have inherited it, seem to be more generous; for they have had no experience of shortage, and, besides, everyone likes his own work more than [other people's], as parents and poets do.*

It is not easy for a generous person to grow rich, since he is ready to spend, not to take or keep, and honors wealth for the sake of giving, not for itself. §21 Indeed, that is why fortune is denounced, because those who most deserve to grow rich actually do so least. This is only to be expected, however, since someone cannot possess wealth, any more than other things, if he pays no attention to possessing it.

§22 Still, he does not give to the wrong people, at the wrong time, and so on. For if he did, he would no longer be acting in accord with generosity, and if he spent his resources on the wrong sort of giving, he would have nothing left to spend for the right purposes. §23 For, as we have said, the generous person is the one who spends in accord with his means, and for the right purposes, whereas the one who exceeds his means is wasteful. That is why tyrants are not called wasteful, since it seems they will have difficulty exceeding their possessions in giving and spending.

§24 Since generosity, then, is a mean concerned with the giving and the taking of wealth, the generous person will both give and spend the right amounts for the right purposes, in small and large matters alike, and do this with pleasure. He will also take the right amounts from the right sources. For since the virtue is a mean about both giving and taking, he will do both in the right way; for decent giving implies decent taking, and the other sort of taking is contrary to the decent sort. Hence the states that imply each other are present at the same time in the same subject, whereas the contrary states clearly are not. 1121a

§25 If the generous person finds that his spending deviates from what is fine and right, he will feel pain, but moderately and in the right way; for it is proper to virtue to feel both pleasure and pain in the right things and in the right way.*

§26 The generous person is also an easy partner to have common dealings with matters of money; §27 for he can easily be treated unjustly, since he does not honor money, and is more grieved if he has failed to spend what it was right to spend than if he has spent what it was wrong to spend—here he does not please Simonides.*

1121a §28 The wasteful person is in error here too, since he feels neither pleasure nor pain at the right things or in the right way; this will be more evident as we go on.

§29 We have said, then, that wastefulness and ungenerosity are excesses and deficiencies in two things, in giving and taking—for we also count spending as giving. Now wastefulness is excessive in giving and not taking, but deficient in taking. Ungenerosity is deficient in giving and excessive in taking, but in small matters.

§30 Now the different aspects of wastefulness are not very often combined; for it is not easy to take from nowhere and give to everyone, since private citizens soon outrun their resources in giving, and private citizens are the ones who seem to be wasteful. §31 However, such a person seems to be quite a lot better than the ungenerous person, since he is easily cured, both by growing older and by poverty, and is capable of reaching the intermediate condition.* For he has the features proper to the generous person, since he gives and does not take, though he does neither rightly or well. If, then, he is changed, by habituation or some other means, so that he does them rightly and well, he will be generous; for then he will give to the right people and will not take from the wrong sources. This is why the wasteful person seems not to be base in his character; for excess in giving without taking is proper to a foolish person, not to a vicious or ignoble one. §32 Someone who is wasteful in this way seems to be much better than the ungenerous person, both for the reasons just given and because he benefits many, whereas the ungenerous person benefits no one, not even himself.

§33 Most wasteful people, however, as we have said, [not only give wrongly, but] also take from the wrong sources, and to this extent are ungenerous.* §34 They become acquisitive because they wish to spend, but cannot do this readily, since they soon exhaust all they have; hence *1121b* they are compelled to provide from elsewhere. At the same time they care nothing for the fine, and so take from any source without scruple; for they have an urge to give,* and the way or source does not matter to them.

§35 This is why their ways of giving are not generous either, since they are not fine, do not aim at the fine, and are not done in the right way. Rather, these people sometimes enrich people who ought to be poor, and would give nothing to people with sound characters, but would give much to flatterers or to those providing some other pleasure. That is why most of these people are also intemperate. For since they part with money readily, they also spend it lavishly on intemperance; and because their lives do not aim at the fine, they decline toward pleasures.

§36 If, then, the wasteful person has been left without a guide, he changes into this;* but if he receives attention, he might reach the intermediate and the right state.

§37 Ungenerosity, however, is incurable, since old age and every incapacity seem to make people ungenerous.* And it comes more naturally to

human beings than wastefulness; for the many are money-lovers rather *1121b15* than givers. §38 Moreover, it extends widely and has many species, since there seem to be many ways of being ungenerous. For it consists in two conditions, deficiency in giving and excess in taking; but it is not found as a whole in all cases. Sometimes the two conditions are separated, and some people go to excess in taking, whereas others are deficient in giving.

§39 For the people called misers, tightfisted, skinflints and so on, are all deficient in giving, but they do not go after other people's goods and do not wish to take them. With some people the reason for this is some sort of decency in them, and a concern to avoid what is shameful. For some people seem—at least, this is what they say—to hold on to their money so that they will never be compelled to do anything shameful.* These include the cheeseparer, and everyone like that; he is so called from his excessive refusal to give anything. Others keep their hands off other people's property because they are afraid,* supposing that it is not easy for them to take other people's property without other people taking theirs too; hence, they say, they are content* if they neither take from others nor give to them.

§40 Other people, by contrast, go to excess in taking, by taking anything from any source—those, for instance, who work at degrading occupations,* pimps and all such people, and usurers who lend small *1122a* amounts at high interest; for all of these take the wrong amounts from the wrong sources.

§41 Shameful love of gain is apparently their common feature, since they all put up with reproaches for some gain—more precisely, for a small gain. §42 For those who take the wrong things from the wrong sources on a large scale—such as tyrants who sack cities and plunder temples—are called wicked, impious, and unjust, but not ungenerous. §43 The ungenerous, however, include the gambler and the robber,* since these are shameful lovers of gain. For in pursuit of gain both go to great efforts and put up with reproaches; the robber faces the greatest dangers to get his haul, while the gambler takes his gains from his friends, the very people he ought to be giving to. Both of them, then, are shameful lovers of gain, because they wish to acquire gains from the wrong sources; and all these methods of acquisition are ungenerous.

§44 It is plausibly said that ungenerosity is contrary to generosity. For it is a greater evil than wastefulness; and error in this direction is more common than the error of wastefulness, as we have described it. §45 So much, then, for generosity and the vices opposed to it.

2

[Magnificence]

Next, it seems appropriate to discuss magnificence also. For it seems to be, like generosity, a virtue concerned with wealth, but it does not extend,

1122a as generosity does, to all the actions involving wealth, but only to those involving heavy expenses, and in them it exceeds generosity in its large scale. For, just as the name [*megaloprepeia*] itself suggests, magnificence is expenditure that is fitting [*prepousa*] in its large scale [*megethos*]. §2 But large scale is large relative to something; for the expenses of the captain of a warship and of the leader of a delegation are not the same.* Hence what is fitting is also relative to oneself, the circumstances, and the purpose.

§3 Someone is called magnificent only if he spends the worthy amount on a large purpose, not on a trivial or an ordinary purpose like the one who 'gave to many a wanderer';* for the magnificent person is generous, but generosity does not imply magnificence.*

§4 The deficiency falling short of this state is called stinginess. The excess is called vulgarity, poor taste, and such things. These are excesses not because they spend an excessively great amount on the right things, but because they show off in the wrong circumstances and in the wrong way. We shall discuss these vices later.

§5 The magnificent person, in contrast to these, is like a scientific expert, since he is able to observe what will be the fitting amount, and to 1122b spend large amounts in an appropriate way. §6 For, as we said at the start, a state is defined by its activities and its objects; now the magnificent person's expenditures* are large and fitting; so also, then, must the results be, since that is what makes the expense large and fitting to the result. Hence the result must be worthy of the expense, and the expense worthy of, or even in excess of, the result.

§7 In this sort of spending the magnificent person will aim at the fine; for that is a common feature of the virtues.* §8 Moreover, he will spend gladly and readily, since it is stingy to count every penny. §9 He will think more about the finest and most fitting way to spend than about the cost or about the cheapest way to do it.

§10 Hence the magnificent person must also be generous; for the generous person will also spend what is right in the right way. But it is in this spending that the large scale of the magnificent person, his greatness, is found, since his magnificence is a sort of large scale of generosity in these things; and from an expense that is equal [to a nonmagnificent person's] he will make the result more magnificent. For a possession and a result have different sorts of excellence; the most honored [and hence most excellent] possession is the one worth most—for example, gold—but the most honored result is the one that is great and fine, since that is what is admirable to behold.* Now what is magnificent is admirable, and the excellence of the result consists in its large scale.*

§11 This sort of excellence is found in the sorts of expenses called honorable, such as expenses for the gods—dedications, temples, sacrifices, and so on, for everything divine—and in expenses that provoke a good competition for honor, for the common good,* if, for instance, some

city thinks a splendid chorus or warship or a feast for the city must be provided. 1122b

§12 But in all cases, as we have said, we fix the right amount by reference to the agent [as well as the task]—by who he is and what resources he has; for the amounts must be worthy of these, fitting the producer as well as the result.

§13 That is why a poor person could not be magnificent; he lacks the means for large and fitting expenditures. If he tries to be magnificent, he is foolish; for he spends more than what is worthy and right for him, whereas correct spending accords with virtue. §14 Large spending befits those who have the means, acquired through their own efforts or their ancestors or connections, or are well born or reputable, and so on; for each of these conditions includes greatness and reputation for worth.

§15 This, then, above all is the character of the magnificent person, and magnificence is found in these sorts of expenses, as we have said, since these are the largest and most honored.

It is found also in those private expenses that arise only once, such as a 1123a wedding and the like, and in those that concern the whole city, or the people in it with a reputation for worth—the receiving of foreign guests and sending them off, gifts and exchanges of gifts. For the magnificent person spends money on the common good, not on himself, and the gifts have some similarity to dedications.

§16 It is also proper to the magnificent person to build a house befitting his riches, since this is also a suitable adornment.* He spends more readily on long-lasting results, since these are the finest. In each case he spends on what is fitting. §17 For what suits gods does not suit human beings, and what suits a temple does not suit a tomb.

And since each great expense is great in relation to a particular kind of object, the most magnificent will be a great expense on a great object, and the [magnificent] in a particular area will be what is great in relation to the particular kind of object.* §18 Moreover, greatness in the results is not the same as greatness in an expense, since the finest ball or oil bottle has the magnificence proper to a gift for a child, but its value is small and paltry.* §19 That is why it is proper to the magnificent person, whatever kind of thing he produces, to produce it magnificently, since this is not easily exceeded, and to produce something worthy of the expense.

§20 This, then, is the character of the magnificent person.

The vulgar person who exceeds [the mean] exceeds by spending more than is right, as has been said. For in small expenses he spends a lot, and puts on an inappropriate display. He gives his club a dinner party in the style of a wedding banquet,* and when he supplies a chorus for a comedy, he brings them onstage dressed in purple, as they do at Megara.* In all this he aims not at the fine, but at the display of his wealth and at the

1123a admiration he thinks he wins in this way. Where a large expense is right, he spends a little, and he spends a lot where a small expense is right.*

§21 The stingy person will be deficient in everything. After spending the largest amounts, he will refuse a small amount, and so destroy a fine
30 result. Whatever he does, while he is doing it he will hesitate and consider how he can spend the smallest possible amount; he will even moan about spending this, and will always think he is doing something on a larger scale than is right.

§22 These states, vulgarity and stinginess, are vices. But they do not bring reproaches, since they do no harm to one's neighbors* and are not too disgraceful.

3

[Magnanimity]

35 Magnanimity seems, even if we go simply by the name, to be concerned
1123b with great things.* Let us see first the sorts of things it is concerned with. §2 It does not matter whether we consider the state itself or the person who acts in accord with it.

§3 The magnanimous person, then, seems* to be the one who thinks himself worthy* of great things and is really worthy of them. For if someone is not worthy of them but thinks he is, he is foolish, and no virtuous person is foolish or senseless; hence the magnanimous person is the one
5 we have mentioned. §4 For if someone is worthy of little and thinks so, he is temperate, but not magnanimous; §5 for magnanimity is found in greatness, just as beauty is found in a large body, and small people can be attractive and well proportioned, but not beautiful.*

§6 Someone who thinks he is worthy of great things, but is not worthy of them, is vain; but not everyone who thinks he is worthy of greater things than he is worthy of is vain.

10 §7 Someone who thinks he is worthy of less than he is worthy of is pusillanimous,* whether he is worthy of great or of moderate things, or of little and thinks himself worthy of still less. The one who seems most pusillanimous is the one who is worthy of great things; for consider how little he would think of himself if he were worthy of less.

§8 The magnanimous person, then, is at the extreme insofar as he makes great claims. But insofar as he makes them rightly, he is intermedi-
15 ate; for what he thinks he is worthy of accords with his real worth, whereas the others are excessive or deficient. §12 The pusillanimous
25 person is deficient both in relation to himself [i.e., his worth] and in relation to the magnanimous person's estimate of his own worth. §13 The vain person makes claims that are excessive for himself, but not for the magnanimous person.*

§9 If, then, he thinks he is worthy of great things, and is worthy of them, especially of the greatest things, he has one concern above all.